Wednesday, October 17, 2007

Hypothesis re-construction

I expect that states and IOs will include non-state actors in governance if doing so lowers the costs of governance. This statement produces several hypotheses for the frequency and type of participatory arrangements between states, IOs and non-state actors.
H1: the greater the ability of non-state actors to reduce the costs of governance the more likely they will be granted institutional participation.

This assumes certain qualities of the non-state actors that are granted participation in global governance.
H2: The non-state actors involved in implementation will be those that provide tangible or substantive benefits to IOs and states

However, actors with decision making power are expected to be reluctant to share such power, and thus I also expect that the greater the power over outcomes that accompanies participation, the less likely states and IOs are to grant such roles to third parties. I have theorized four types of participation for non-state actors: implementation, voice, appeal and vote. Each of these garners non-state actors increasing power over enduring outcomes, and thus should be less easily attained.
H3: The greater the institutional power to influence enduring outcomes, the greater the comparative advantage of non-state actors to reduce costs necessary for inclusion.

Implementation --> Voice --> Appeal à Vote
Low Cost Reducing Advantage --> Medium CRA --> High CRA

This provides three additional hypotheses:

H4: Where an IO grants NSAs Voice it will be likely to grant Implementation
H5: Where an IO grants NSAs Appeal it will be likely to grant Voice
H6: Where an IO grants Voting power it will be likely to grant Appeal power

Sunday, October 7, 2007

Hypothesis construction

H 1: Non-state actor demand (push) is neither necessary nor sufficient for participation
in IO implementation

H 2: Non-state actor comparative advantage (pull) is necessary and sufficient for
participation in IO implementation

(The non-state actors involved in implementation will not be the largest, or most vocal, or random groups but those that provide tangible or substantive benefits to IOs and states)

H 3: Either non-state actor comparative advantage (pull) or de fact veto (push) is
necessary for decision making participation (voice or appeal, not vote)

(Persuasion of normative reasons for inclusion is not sufficient for inclusion in decision making)

H4: Both non-state actor comparative advantage (pull) and a de facto veto (push) is
necessary for voting rights within an IO.

Alt. H: States and IOs will favor NGO participation across the board for reasons of
normative legitimacy, or because they have been persuaded by NGOs.


It has been a long time since I updated this supposed tool of dissertation efficiency. Much has changed, though there is a clear evolutionary path from the questions and work shown in the last posts. I have a new question, shifting from the topic of GP3s to institutional participation granted to non-state actors by international organizations. GP3s are often relevant to this, though the bulk of partnerships do not explicitly include an international organization, and my new organizational framework, I think, works better for me and my purposes.

I have created a diagram of my hypotheses, though I am uncertain about how to post it here. Ill work on that. Meanwhile, my current stuck-point is making key decisions about case selection and basic research design.

Thursday, February 15, 2007

GP3, here we go.

Q1. What explains the proliferation of global public-private partnerships of the last decade?
Q2. How effective are global public-private partnerships at accomplishing their objectives?
Q3. What accountability mechanisms do global public-private partnerships provide?
I have these huge broad big questions. I think I am moving in a good direction, towards something with potential. Scary as it is, I have narrowed to one topic: GP3s it is.

Tuesday, December 12, 2006

Contender 2: local v. global, development projects.
do piecemeal or grand plan approaches work best? how does the interaction between the IOs/states and the effector arms, on the ground, work? is there a current trend toward the micro-tising of all development work? what is the proper role for the centralized global IOs in coordinating small local projects?


contestant 1: IP3
IP3s in global governance. empirically mapping the existence and frequency. typology - looking specifically at those where private actors are equal players at negotiating and planning table. multistakeholder arrangements. corporatism in IOs. this inquiry then could focus on either effectiveness or legitimacy, or both. under what conditions do IP3s work? are they a result of resource interdependency? this topic would run into issues of corporate responsibility, private v public governance and neoliberalism, state of the state, sovereignty etc etc.

do private for-profit organizations join in partnerships for a market-based reason, improving consumer image or to create stable markets etc, or because of the "shadow of hierarchy" threat of regulation, or because they have been somehow persuaded normatively? certainly some of all three, and predominantly the first two.

the begining.

this will be the journal of my process. a place to post goals and accomplishments, primarily for my own use. i do not expect to share this blog with the world, predominantly because i do not expect the world to care. but who knows, perhaps it will develop into its own. currently, i am hoping it will assist me in the process, in some yet unforseen way.

where i am now:
point zero. not even at point zero, im a couple miles ahead of the starting line.

next goal: (deadline: christmas)
a free write on topic areas. key question: what do i want to be an expert in? which topic sentence produces the greatest most prolific and interesting free write? what gets my fingers moving and has the most interesting potential?

next next goal: (deadline: January 9, 2007)
define a short list of specific research questions. elaborate a bit upon these questions and send to advisors for reflection.

ultimate goal at this point: (deadline, January 23, 2007)
define one question to start proposal.1, a dry run to be pursued in spring semester.