Hypothesis re-construction

I expect that states and IOs will include non-state actors in governance if doing so lowers the costs of governance. This statement produces several hypotheses for the frequency and type of participatory arrangements between states, IOs and non-state actors.
H1: the greater the ability of non-state actors to reduce the costs of governance the more likely they will be granted institutional participation.

This assumes certain qualities of the non-state actors that are granted participation in global governance.
H2: The non-state actors involved in implementation will be those that provide tangible or substantive benefits to IOs and states

However, actors with decision making power are expected to be reluctant to share such power, and thus I also expect that the greater the power over outcomes that accompanies participation, the less likely states and IOs are to grant such roles to third parties. I have theorized four types of participation for non-state actors: implementation, voice, appeal and vote. Each of these garners non-state actors increasing power over enduring outcomes, and thus should be less easily attained.
H3: The greater the institutional power to influence enduring outcomes, the greater the comparative advantage of non-state actors to reduce costs necessary for inclusion.

Implementation --> Voice --> Appeal à Vote
Low Cost Reducing Advantage --> Medium CRA --> High CRA

This provides three additional hypotheses:

H4: Where an IO grants NSAs Voice it will be likely to grant Implementation
H5: Where an IO grants NSAs Appeal it will be likely to grant Voice
H6: Where an IO grants Voting power it will be likely to grant Appeal power

Hypothesis construction

H 1: Non-state actor demand (push) is neither necessary nor sufficient for participation
in IO implementation

H 2: Non-state actor comparative advantage (pull) is necessary and sufficient for
participation in IO implementation

(The non-state actors involved in implementation will not be the largest, or most vocal, or random groups but those that provide tangible or substantive benefits to IOs and states)

H 3: Either non-state actor comparative advantage (pull) or de fact veto (push) is
necessary for decision making participation (voice or appeal, not vote)

(Persuasion of normative reasons for inclusion is not sufficient for inclusion in decision making)

H4: Both non-state actor comparative advantage (pull) and a de facto veto (push) is
necessary for voting rights within an IO.

Alt. H: States and IOs will favor NGO participation across the board for reasons of
normative legitimacy, or because they have been persuaded by NGOs.

Back

It has been a long time since I updated this supposed tool of dissertation efficiency. Much has changed, though there is a clear evolutionary path from the questions and work shown in the last posts. I have a new question, shifting from the topic of GP3s to institutional participation granted to non-state actors by international organizations. GP3s are often relevant to this, though the bulk of partnerships do not explicitly include an international organization, and my new organizational framework, I think, works better for me and my purposes.

I have created a diagram of my hypotheses, though I am uncertain about how to post it here. Ill work on that. Meanwhile, my current stuck-point is making key decisions about case selection and basic research design.